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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHERYL HARDY, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY OF AMERICA; WAYNE L. 
RIGBY, Insurance Agent, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
Docket No. 20582 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
The Prudential Insurance Company of America ("Prudential") and 
Wayne L. Rigby, defendants and respondents herein, petition the Court 
for rehearing on the above matter pursuant to Rule 35, Rules of the 
Utah Supreme Court. This Petition is made on the following grounds: 
1. The Decision herein has not addressed — and apparently has 
overlooked the question of the propriety of summary judgment in favor 
of Wayne L. Rigby. Neither defendant's Brief, nor her counsel's oral 
remarks, stated any reason why the judgment should not be affirmed as 
to Mr. Rigby. 
2. The Decision apparently misapprehended both the relevant 
facts and the applicable law concerning Prudential's entitlement to 
summary judgment by reason of Lynn and Cheryl Hardy's fraud. Indeed, 
the Decision, as rendered, would make it impossible for a trial court 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
to dispose summarily of even the clearest claims or defenses grounded 
in fraud. 
ARGUMENT 
I-
THE COURT'S DECISION OVERLOOKED THE 
QUESTION OF THE PROPERTY OF SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF WAYNE L. RIGBY, 
WHICH PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT'S BRIEF DID 
NOT OPPOSE. 
Respondents pointed out, at page 2 of their Brief herein: 
Plaintiff has mentioned her claim against Mr. Rigby no where 
is her brief -- nor, for that matter, in her Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 
at 992-1011.) The allegations against him, a non-diverse 
defendant, apparently were never meant to be taken serious-
ly-
The Amended Complaint's three claims are that "Prudential has 
wilfully breached the contract of insurance on decedent's life ... ." 
(Amended Compl., Count I, 1[9); that "Prudential has acted in bad faith 
by wrongfully and unreasonably refusing to pay the insurance proceeds" 
(Id., Count II, iri4), and that "Prudential by wilfully and intention-
ally refusing to pay plaintiff's claim ... has engaged in outrageous 
and intolerable conduct ... " (Id., Count III, 1U8). R. 29-33. 
Obviously, none of these alleged wrongful acts were committed by Mr. 
Rigby, who, it is undisputed, had no part in the claims process or in 
the denial of plaintiff's claim. R. 78-94, 1182. He should not be 
burdened with an unfounded lawsuit and the summary judgment in his 
favor, which plaintiff never contested, should be affirmed. 
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II. 
THE COURT'S DECISION HEREIN MIS-
APPREHENDED BOTH THE FACTS RELEVANT TO 
THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDING OF FRAUD 
AND THE LAW SPECIFICALLY APPLICABLE TO 
THIS POINT. 
As the Decision notes, at pages 5 and 6, an insurance policy is 
subject to rescission in any of several events, one of which is fraud. 
UTAH CODE ANN. §31-19-8 (1974 Repl.Vol.). "Fraud", of course, is an 
act of intentional deception. 
It is well-established that mere negligence in believing an 
intentionally untrue statement is not sufficient to defeat a claim 
for fraud. 
Negligence is a proper defense in a case of negligent 
misrepresentations, but it is not a proper defense in the 
case of intentional misrepresentation. 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 F.2d 798, 804 (Utah 
1980). Accord, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980), 
Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 159 P.2d 134, 137 (1945); Holdsworth 
v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687, 694 (10th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 430 F.2d 
955 (1977) (applying Utah law). Therefore, plaintiff's claims that 
Prudential should have figured out that Hardy's statements were untrue 
provide no answer to a claim of fraud.1 
1Plaintiff relies upon such claims as Dr. Thome's statement 
that Hardy's family history, smoking, etc., "constitute significant 
external indications of potential cardiac abnormalities." PI. Br., 
App. at 55. However, for underwriting purposes, there is a vast 
difference between a potential abnormality and an existing one. 
Hardy's family history and EEG result -- all indications of 
potential problems — were considered by Prudential, but did not 
quite make him ratable. By contrast, the fact that he had had a 
heart attack would have rated him at least a "Special Class 4," if 
he was insurable at all. R. 683-685. 
3 
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The decision at least twice stated that Lynn Hardy "did not 
disclose11 or "did not inform" Shauna Perry, a paramedical, or Dr. 
Joseph Evans, a physician, of his 1974 heart attack. Dec, at 2-3. 
In fact, he specifically denied having had any cardiovascular 
problems. When he was asked: "[H]ave you ever been treated by a 
doctor for or had any known sign of a disease or disorder of the ... 
heart, arteries or veins?" he answered that he had not. PI. Br., App. 
at 8, 10. That was an affirmative misstatement, which he knew was 
untrue. He did not say, "I had a problem, but I'm well now" or "It 
doesn't matter." He denied ever having had a problem. He did not 
simply fail to volunteer information; he said something which he knew 
was untrue. Similarly, Mrs. Hardy told an underwriting investigator 
Lynn "never had a serious illness." R. at 671-677. (The Decision's 
statement, at page 5, note 1, that Prudential had cited no mis-
representations by Mrs. Hardy, is incorrect.) 
The Decision indicated that it is plausible that Hardy answered 
untruthfully concerning his 1974 heart attach because he was told that 
history more than five years old did not matter. (But if this were 
so, why would he have volunteered detailed information about his other 
medical history going as far back as his childhood rheumatic fever? 
PI. Br. App. at 8, 10. He picked and chose what he would conceal.) 
Further, Hardy made the following untrue statements about his 
medical history within the past five years: 
a. When he was asked, if he had "in the past 5 years .. 
consulted or been attended or examined by any doctor or other 
practitioner," he answered "No" (Ibid.) thus concealing his 
4 
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treatment by Dr. Joseph Thorne, who is "engaged in the exclusive 
practice of cardiology" (Thorne Afft., §1, Br. App. at 53); 
b. He concealed his examination at the High Risk Coronary 
Consultation Clinic, which entailed a full review of his heart 
problems (R. 677-682)2; 
c. He concealed his examination at the University of Utah 
cardiology department in 1979 (Ibid.); 
d. When he was asked if he was taking any prescription 
drugs, he answered in the negative, although he was taking 
Atromid-S, a cardiovascular medication.3 
This is not a case in which the claimed defrauder can explain his 
motivations to a trier of fact. The district court had to induce 
Hardy's motives from the objective evidence. That evidence allows 
only one conclusion: that he intentionally misrepresented his medical 
history to conceal his heart attack and his current heart disease. 
He obviously did not operate on the assumption that his medical 
2Dr. Thorne states that he referred Hardy to the Clinic "to 
participate in a study of the effect of familial relationships on 
cardiac disorders" (PI. Br., App. at 54) — and such as his. 
3The Decision states that "he was not taking medication to treat 
his heart" (Dec, at 4), apparently in reliance upon Dr. Thome's 
carefully worded affidavit. PI. Br., App. at 54. The affidavit 
states: "Atromid-S is prescribed only to regulate the cholesterol and 
triglyceride level. Atromid-S has no direct physiological function 
or affect on the heart." (Emphasis added.) This is too clever by 
half. Cholesterol and triglyceride levels determine the amount of 
obstruction in the arteries; when arteries become blocked, the result 
is an occlusion, or in popular parlance, a heart attack. While it may 
have no direct physiological function or effect on the heart, the 
drug's purpose obviously is to retard further obstruction of the 
arteries and thus to prevent heart attacks. It is not prescribed for 
people who do not have cardiovascular problems. 
5 
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history of more than five years was immaterial and that his more 
recent history was material. On the contrary, he revealed such 
matters as his childhood rheumatic fever and his eleven-year-old 
prostate problems, while concealing his heart attack. Similarly, in 
reporting his recent medical history he omitted mentioning Dr. Thorne, 
the High Risk Cardiovascular Center and the University of Utah Medical 
Center, Cardiology Department. He also had concealed his heart 
history on Department of Transportation examinations — even on an 
examination within five years of his attack (R. at 682). There was 
only one pattern to Hardy's revelation and concealment: he omitted 
every treatment by a heart specialist or clinic and every event of 
cardiovascular related treatment, no matter whom he was dealing with. 
A court is not obliged to create issues of fact in considering 
a motion for summary judgment. Mintz v. Mathers Fund, Inc., 463 F.2d 
495, 498 (7th Cir. 1972). A party's self-serving conjecture cannot 
overcame overwhelming objective evidence. Anderson v. Beneficial Fire 
& G. Co., 21 Utah 2d 173, 442 P.2d 993 (1968). 
In the instant case, there can be no serious question that Hardy 
set out to conceal and that he succeeded in doing so. That Lynn and 
Cheryl Hardy committed fraud should be deemed established. It follows 
that plaintiff's claims of negligence by Prudential must fail. The 
only remaining issue is plaintiff's claim that Mr. Rigby told Mr. 
Hardy to omit his heart attack from Part One of the application. As 
has been pointed out already, this claim is palpably unbelievable 
because every witness Mrs. Hardy summons testifies differently. 
Further, the form which Mr. Rigby completed — Part One (PI. Br. App. 
6 
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at 4-5) -- only inquired if Hardy had had a heart attack within the 
previous 12 months. Hardy's negative answer to that question, of 
course, was correct. 
CONCLUSION 
The above matter should be reheard and the above matters 
addressed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this Jjr day of September, 1988. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
RICHARD B. FERRARI 
Attorneys for Defendants-Respondents 
7 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
